Using the CEM pension fund data set, we document the cost structure and performance of a large sample of US pension funds. To date, self-reporting biases and a deficiency of comprehensive return and cost data have severely hindered pension fund performance studies. The bias-free CEM dataset resolves these issues and provides detailed information on fund-specific returns, benchmarks and costs for all types of pension plans and equity mandates. We find that pension fund cost levels are substantially lower than mutual fund fees. The domestic equity investments of US pension funds tend to generate abnormal returns (after expenses and trading costs) close to zero or slightly positive, contrasting the average underperformance of mutual funds. However, small cap mandates of defined benefit funds have outperformed their benchmarks by about 3% a year. While larger scale brings costs advantages, liquidity limitations seem to allow only smaller funds, and especially small cap mandates, to outperform their benchmarks.
Introduction
Pension funds are a critical component of many people's overall financial position and among the largest institutional investors in the US. However, remarkably little is known about their performance and cost structures. By contrast, the mutual fund and hedge fund sectors have been heavily scrutinized. The lack of pension fund performance studies can be largely attributed to an absence of sufficient data, which is a direct result of a lack of reporting guidelines. Mutual funds are required to report their performance and fees on a regular basis, whereas no such obligation exists for pension funds.
The main contribution of this paper is to employ the CEM pension fund database to provide a comprehensive overview of the performance and costs of domestic equity investments by US pension funds. The database, which does not suffer from reporting biases, covers approximately 40% of the US pension industry in terms of assets, representing a wide variety of fund sizes and equity mandates, and contains both defined benefit and defined contribution plans. Specifically, our database consists of 463 defined benefit pension funds for [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , and 248 defined contribution pension funds for 1997-2006. We find that pension fund cost levels are substantially lower than mutual fund fees, largely as a result of scale advantages. The risk-adjusted net performance of total equity investments of the funds (after expenses and trading costs) tends to be positive and statistically significant, though relatively small after also benchmark-adjusting. However, small cap and smaller size mandates tend to generate positive alpha. For example, small cap mandates of defined benefit funds outperform their benchmarks by about 3% a year.
1 These results contrast with the average underperformance of mutual funds.
We further aim to explain cross-sectional differences in risk-adjusted returns, finding that fund size erodes risk-adjusted performance. Further, this effect is most pronounced for investments that are prone to liquidity risk. This explanation is consistent with large pension funds being unable to respond quickly to news or invest large parts of their portfolio in relatively illiquid stocks. We also give detailed insight in the variety of benchmarks used to evaluate asset managers and the exact cost structure of pension funds.
Pension fund return data in previous work was not only limited but also typically employed on a managed account level, i.e. returns are provided for managers employed by pension funds (see e.g. Beebower & Bergstrom (1977) , Coggin, Fabozzi, & Rahman (1993) and Busse, Goyal, & Wahal (2009) ). This reporting structure prohibits direct documentation of the performance of pension funds as such, since managers are often employed by more than one pension fund and pension funds typically hire more than one manager. As a result, one typically does not know which manager is trading for which fund and, therefore, one cannot compute fund performance.
Arguably, the largest drawback of the data collection on manager level is the inability to measure cross-sectional differences between pension funds. Furthermore, previously used data on pension funds typically lacked comprehensive cost data. 2 Finally, our data also includes information on the benchmarks used by pension funds, which can be used for performance evaluation and is, to the best of our knowledge, unique to the literature.
The lack of comprehensive return, benchmark and cost data and possible self-reporting biases have induced a broad diversity of conclusions on pension fund performance and costs. 3 For example, in the most comprehensive study on plan level, Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny (1992) show that 769 defined benefit plans lag the S&P 500 by 260 basis points yearly. Based on their figures, it seems justified to question the future of the pension industry. However, their result is in sharp contrast to Busse, Goyal, & Wahal (2009) , who perform the most complete study on pension fund accounts so far. They study 6,260 portfolios managed by institutional asset managers on behalf of defined benefit pension funds. Using a conditional multi-factor model, they find that the average fund manager outperforms the market by 124 basis points after expenses.
The absence of consensus on pension fund performance is in marked contrast to the abundant evidence on mutual fund underperformance. A majority of performance studies concludes that after expenses and trading costs, mutual funds perform on average slightly worse than a 2 Apart from a small number of surveys (e.g. McKinsey (2006) and Mercer (2006)), very little has been known about the costs of pension funds. One exception is Bikker and De Dreu (2007) , who focus on administration and investment costs of Dutch pension funds, which constitute only a subset of the total costs of these funds. 3 Other studies, confirming the widely diverging findings on pension fund performance, are the following: Brinson, Hood, & Beebower (1986) study 91 defined benefit plans and conclude that the funds underperform the S&P 500 by 110 basis points per year. Ippolito & Turner (1987) also document underperformance in a sample of 1,526 plans. They conclude that the S&P 500 on average has a return advantage of 44 basis points. Elton, Gruber, & Blake (2006) study mutual funds offered by defined contribution plans and show that they are beaten by the market by 31 basis points per year. Beebower & Bergstrom (1977) examine the performance of 148 US portfolios in a CAPM framework. In their study, the average portfolio outperforms the S&P 500 by 144 basis points per year. Coggin, Fabozzi, & Rahman (1993) document positive selectivity and negative timing skills for a random sample of 71 equity managers from US pension plans.
comparable passive proxy. 4 The above mentioned complications of pension fund data and the contrasting findings of earlier pension fund studies illustrate how difficult it is to create a consistent and comprehensive picture of the performance of the US pension industry and give insight in the benchmarks and cost composition of this sector. The recently available CEM dataset enables us to address the aforementioned issues, thereby strongly improving our understanding of the performance and costs of US pension funds. The CEM database includes annual data on pension plan level, i.e. net returns, benchmarks and costs per fund, and within each fund per mandate (see below). The plan level data and broad coverage of the U.S. pension universe provide the opportunity to determine which factors explain cross-sectional differences in risk-adjusted returns.
Following Kenneth French, who first used the CEM data in his AFA presidential address on the cost of active investing (see French (2008)), we use the data set to complete the picture on cost levels and their driving forces. By linking our data to Compustat, we are able to test for potential biases that could result from the voluntary reporting, and ascertain that our data do not suffer from them. On our performance evaluation, we can differentiate between several mandate types,
i.e. large versus small capitalization stocks, actively versus passively managed portfolios, and externally versus internally managed mandates (only relevant for defined benefit funds).
We find that pension fund cost levels for their domestic equity investments are substantially lower than in the mutual fund industry, with a median annual cost of 27 basis points for defined benefit funds and 51 basis points for defined contribution funds, though with considerable crosssectional variation. Such heterogeneity in cost levels is to a significant extent driven by differences in fund size. For example, the average annual cost levels for the smallest and largest 30% of domestic equity investments of defined benefit funds equal 40 and 15 basis points, respectively. Irrespective of fund size, externally managed mandates are found to be significantly more expensive than their internally managed counterparts. Similarly, actively managed mandates have higher costs than passively managed mandates. Further, pension plan participants benefit from the larger size of their pension plans through lower cost levels in internally managed 4 For example, Malkiel (1995) and Gruber (1996) observe that mutual funds on average underperform the market by the amount of expenses charged to investors. Chan, Chen, & Lakonishok (2002) In particular, the size of the equity holdings has a large and negative coefficient in these alpha regressions, whereas this negative association between the size of the investments and performance is stronger if the liquidity beta is larger, i.e. for less liquid investments.
Finally, we also consider how other fund choices are related to performance, such as how much is invested internally versus externally, and what percentage of investments is actively versus passively managed. In our sample, only about 12% of defined benefit investments are internally managed (and all of the defined contribution investments are), and only 5% of their small cap investments. In general, we find some evidence suggesting that external management performs slightly better, with the difference being smaller for the largest internally managed mandates. This is consistent with investments requiring a certain size in order to be able to build sufficient expertise and profitably keep management in-house.
In conclusion, we argue that pension funds perform close to their benchmarks in the aggregate, and on average outperform in smaller funds and mandates and in small cap mandates. We find some evidence for scale advantages in internally managed portfolios and in bargaining power with external parties.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our data set and measures possible self-reporting biases. In section 3, we describe our methodology. Section 4 presents the cost levels of the various equity mandates and studies the cost differences between funds. In section 5, we present the basic performance evaluation results. Section 6 investigates the importance of liquidity, mandate size and fund size. Section 7 concludes.
The Database
The defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) pension fund data are provided by CEM Benchmarking Incorporated (CEM), which collects detailed information on pension fund costs, benchmarks and performance via yearly questionnaires. 5 While CEM collects data from multiple asset classes and numerous countries, in this paper we focus exclusively on domestic equity investments by US pension funds. Table 1 illustrates the evolution of this part of the database on US pension funds, by reporting the number of funds entering and leaving the database for every sample year. The overview shows that the number of funds in the database is relatively stable.
Therefore, it seems unlikely that our results are driven by a single year or a few funds.
The time frame of our analysis is 1990-2006 for defined benefit and 1997-2006 for defined contribution funds, due to data availability. A total of 463 defined benefit and 248 defined contribution funds report to CEM over the sample period. In any given year, approximately 150 defined benefit and 75 defined contribution US pension funds are included. The number of funds entering and leaving the database is relatively stable over time. In general, pension funds decide to enter the benchmarking process in order to benchmark their investment returns and costs against pension funds of similar size and background. Large-sized pension funds that can afford 5 The Toronto-based company CEM Benchmarking Incorporated specializes in providing independent, objective, and actionable information to pension funds. CEM uses its expertise to compare and benchmark pension funds in a global domain and to provide best practice information to these funds. Since 1990, CEM provides benchmarking services on pension fund investments and administration. The investment benchmarking service provides DB and DC fund sponsors insights into cost, return, and risk of the investments of the funds. Information is collected from multiple asset classes and numerous countries.
the costs of being benchmarked are more inclined to hire CEM. Pension funds also regularly decide to leave the database. There can be several reasons for leaving the data set. Smaller and midsized funds could stop the service in need of costs savings. Mergers and acquisitions among the underlying corporations may cause funds to cease to exist or stop reporting. The same holds for pension funds of companies that merge into another firm or go bankrupt in any given year.
Self-reporting Bias
Pension funds choose CEM's services and in connection to their relationship to CEM provide annual reports on costs levels and performance. Their reporting to CEM is voluntary, which makes the data potentially vulnerable to self-reporting biases. By comparing the means of the groups, we can test whether funds decide to stop reporting as a result of bad performance. 6 In addition to the aforementioned, primary data set (containing returns, benchmarks and costs for anonymous pension funds), CEM provided us also with a secondary database containing only fund names and their entry and exit years in the primary data set and no other variables. However, this secondary database cannot (and was and will not) be linked with the primary, anonymous data source. We only matched the secondary database to the Compustat data, respecting the anonymity of the funds in the primary set containing performance, benchmark and cost figures. 7 This is the total returns over all asset classes (contrasting the equity focus of the rest of the paper). Therefore, the maintained assumption is that funds are likely to stop reporting if their overall performance is bad, i.e. this decision does not merely depend on their equity performance. 8 Funds are matched based on their names. Since some pension funds in the CEM database have no obligation to report to the SEC (e.g. because they are too small) it is impossible to match 100% of funds. Name changes are not considered as entries or exits.
Next, we repeat this test for the year in which funds enter into our database, i.e. we categorize the matched Compustat data into two groups, with group 1 containing all funds in years in which they decide to report to CEM for the first time (excluding the first year of the data set) and the second group containing all the other data. Again, we test if there is a significant difference in the mean ROA between the two groups. This will address the question whether firms start or go back to working with CEM after relatively good performance.
Panels A and B of Table 2 show that we find no evidence of a self-reporting bias in the exiting or entering years. In Panel A, we report the difference in the mean ROA between the groups as defined above, i.e., we measure the difference in mean ROA of funds in their exiting years and all remaining data points, and likewise for funds in their entering years. The differences in mean ROA are all insignificant (highest t-stat equals 0.40). We employ robust standard errors to adjust for autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity. However, as most funds have observations in both groups and irregularly enter and exit the database (see Table 1 ), clustering observations by funds does not make much of a difference.
In a second test of the self-reporting bias, we conduct a logit regression of a dummy variable indicating presence in the CEM database. As independent variables, we use the Compustat ROA performance for the matched sample, the log of the total equity holdings of the funds, and the log of the total equity holdings squared. We use robust standard errors and present marginal effects.
The coefficient on the fund's total ROA is always insignificant, while larger funds are more likely to be included in our database, as shown by the positive loading on fund size. This is consistent with the idea that specialized benchmarking services as provided by CEM are more relevant and cost-effective for larger funds, but gives no evidence for other self-reporting biases related to performance.
Fund size and mandates
The unique structure of the CEM database allows for a detailed breakdown in the evaluation of the performance and cost of domestic equity investments by US pension funds. Specifically, we can divide each pension fund's "mandates" in 3 different dimensions: large versus small capitalization stocks, actively versus passively managed investments, and internally versus externally managed equity investments (the latter separation only occur for defined benefit funds, as all DC funds are externally managed). These 3 dimensions thus give rise to 2 3 = 8 possible different combinations for DB funds (e.g. small cap -external -active, or large cap -internalpassive) and four different combinations for DC funds. The main caveat with regards to these mandates is that the passively managed investments could include 'enhanced' index funds and could potentially further profit from stock lending programs (however, we lack more precise information on this).
The data provided by CEM are reported at the lowest aggregation level (i.e., cost levels and net returns on each of the 8 (for DB) or 4 (for DC) different combinations separately). As a result, we can measure differences between investment styles. The domestic equity returns and costs levels at the higher aggregation level are computed for each fund separately by value-weighting the lower level returns using the equity holdings as weights. Performance is always measured net of costs.
In Panel A of Table 3 we report the distribution of the size of the domestic equity portfolios at the total fund level for both DB and DC funds. The median fund has $1.2 billion in domestic equity investments with an average of $4.2 billion, such that the sample has a clear right-skewed size distribution. The size distribution is relatively stable over time, as shown in Figure 1A for DB funds, presenting the plot of the average log size for five quintile size groups each year.
At the fund level, most of the equity investments are made in large cap stocks (average of 89%) and are done externally (average of 88%). Further, an average of 69% of investments is held in actively managed mandates, the remaining being in passively managed index funds. Panel B of Table 3 ).
We provide cross-sectional graphs for DB funds, using data for 2006 only, in Figure 2 . Figure 2A plots the percentage allocations to small cap mandates of all DB funds against fund size, showing that large funds tend to have greater large cap allocations. Figures 2B and 2C plot the percentage allocations to active and internal mandates, respectively, against fund size. Figure 2B shows that larger pension funds tend to be less active, though until $20 billion under management there seems to be little association between fund size and allocations to actively managed mandates. Figure 2C shows that many DB funds are completely externally managed. For those that have internally managed mandates, these are typically combined with external management. Only four DB funds are (almost) completely internally managed in 2006. Finally, there seems to be little association between fund size and the allocations to internally managed mandates for the subset of DB funds where these occur, while DB funds that are exclusively externally managed tend to be smaller. 
Methodology
This section explains the 'random coefficients' panel data technique used to evaluate pension fund performance, and also describes the three-stage regression analysis, employed to test for cross-sectional differences. Due to the annual frequency of our data, standard time-series regression methods to calculate risk-adjusted performance cannot be employed.
The random coefficients model differs from standard pooled panel regression by allowing the alphas and betas to vary over the cross-section, instead of assuming common parameters for all funds. Our assumption of a common distribution for alphas and betas is less restrictive than common parameters across funds. While being quite similar to Timmermann, Blake, Tonks, & Wermers (2009), our methodology differs from theirs by allowing idiosyncratic risk to vary cross-sectionally.
Specifically, the random coefficient model assumes that fund-specific alphas and betas (e.g. of the Fama-French factors) are independently drawn from hierarchical distributions with common parameters. The hierarchical parameters can be estimated with high precision as we benefit from the large cross-section of our sample. Economically, the higher order parameters can be interpreted as the pension fund industry (or some group/category of funds) alphas and betas.
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For a more detailed description of our random coefficients model, see Swamy (1970 ν a normally distributed zero-mean error term and the other factors and parameters as specified before.
In the second stage, we regress the sum of fund-specific alphas and their corresponding error terms on a set of characteristics for each sample year In line with the Fama-MacBeth procedure, we correct the standard errors of the third-stage regressions for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West procedure.
Pension Fund Cost Levels
The CEM database contains detailed and comprehensive information on the costs of US pension funds. In this section, we provide an overview of the general level of the costs of domestic equity investments, the differences in costs between various plan and mandate types and the role of size as an important driver of these differences. CEM collects all costs that occur when managing equity investments. This includes salaries and fees for external managers (fixed and performancerelated), custody fees, and the costs for managing the fund (salaries of internal fund representatives). The investment costs estimates do not contain trading expenses or any other measures of transaction costs, which are incorporated in the information on holdings and returns.
DC cost figures also include a very small part attributable to the pension delivery, i.e. the cost of distributing mutual funds to plan members.
Panel A of Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of the costs at various levels of aggregation. At the fund level, the median cost level is about 27 basis points per year for DB funds and about 51 basis points per year for DC funds. Swensen (2005) shows that average mutual fund fees amount to 150 basis points for both load and no-load funds. Typical costs of pension plans are thus substantially lower than mutual fund fees. Table 4 indicates that larger mandates have significantly lower cost levels. We find strong evidence of scale advantages in costs by comparing cost levels for the 30% largest and 30% smallest funds for both DB and DC funds and their various mandates. At the fund level, the largest 30% of DB funds have costs of about 15 basis points a year, versus an average cost of 40 basis points a year for the smallest 30% of DB funds. For DC funds, the group of 30% largest funds has an average cost of 42 basis points a year, versus 64 basis points for the group of 30% smallest funds. The difference in average costs of 20 -25 basis points a year between the groups of largest versus smallest funds can also be found at the various mandate levels. The only exceptions are passive and internal mandates for DB funds, because of their much lower cost levels.
Panel B of
11 Also, the mandates with higher cost levels in Table 4 tend to have smaller size (see Table   3 ). Therefore, much of the differences in average cost across categories (e.g., defined benefit vs.
defined contribution) in Table 3 may therefore be explained by such size discrepancies. Figure 3A plots the total costs levels for DB funds against their total size of the equity investments, using the data for 2006 only. This scatter plot strongly suggests scale advantages, or a negative association between costs and size, which we will consider more formally in a pooled panel regression framework below. Figure 3B presents The importance of size and investment style on costs levels is further investigated in Figure 3B ), for the mandate-level regressions we only show results with year fixed effects and with both year and fund fixed effects.
In the results without fund fixed effects, the size loading is significantly negative across all mandate types for both defined benefit and defined contribution plans. As control variables, we include the percentage invested in small cap shares, the percentage actively invested and the percentage externally invested. Though these variables explain considerable cross-sectional variation in cost levels, none of them is as strong and consistently significant as log fund size.
14 Its estimated coefficient suggests that size is quite important economically. For example, for fund-level DB funds a one-standard deviation increase to the log of the fund size is associated with a cost level that is 27 basis points lower (= -3.79 x 7.22), which equals the median cost level.
The coefficient on size is largest for small cap mandates, consistent with scale advantages being most important when average cost levels are largest.
Adding fund fixed effects removes considerable variation, as indicated by the much higher R 2 , i.e.
fund size does not vary strongly over time, especially relative to the large cross-sectional variation in size. As a result, the coefficient for size becomes insignificant at the mandate-level in most cases. At the fund-level the coefficient on size remains similar, and is significant for DB funds but only marginally significant for DC funds.
12 Analogous figures for DC funds are quite similar and omitted to save space. 13 Results are robust to using robust standard errors clustered in both time and fund dimensions. 14 The results in this table are not affected by possible multicollinearity, as cross-sectional correlations between factors do not exceed 30%.
Basic Performance Evaluation Results
In this section, we present basic performance evaluation results of the domestic equity investments of US pension funds. In general, we use both net returns and net benchmark-adjusted returns, and compute risk-adjusted alphas using the four-factor Fama-French-Carhart model of either. We specify net excess returns as gross domestic equity returns minus the risk free rate and fund-specific costs. Net benchmark-adjusted returns are calculated by subtracting fund-specific benchmark returns and costs from the gross domestic equity returns. Using both net returns and net benchmark-adjusted returns is an important robustness check, as in practice portfolio managers tend to be evaluated relative to their benchmarks. Further, Cremers, Petajisto and
Zitzewitz (2010) show that benchmark-adjusting returns is an potentially important robustness check when evaluating the performance of groups of mutual funds sorted by investment style.
1 Benchmarks
In this subsection, we give an overview of the benchmarks used by pension funds to evaluate performance and measure the net, risk-adjusted performance of the pension industry. In their annual questionnaire, CEM requests pension funds to report the benchmarks used to evaluate large and small cap mandates. Funds are required to provide an exact description of the benchmark. Consequently, we can construct market shares for each benchmark for every given year. Figure 4 gives an overview of each benchmark's relative market share in large cap mandates. 15 Figure 5 displays the evolution of the market share of various small cap benchmarks from 1992 to 2006. Figure 4 shows that while the S&P 500 has been the most important large cap benchmark throughout the nineties, its popularity as a benchmark has significantly declined from 50% of large cap funds in 1996 to only 26% at the end of our sample in 2006. Instead, funds are increasingly using the Russell 1000, Russell 3000 and Wilshire 5000 as yardstick for their returns on large capitalization stocks. 16 As indicated by Figure 5 , the Russell 2000 is the dominant small cap benchmark throughout the entire sample period, and especially after 1995. For example, its 15 There are two reasons why percentages market share do not sum to 100. First, we omitted several benchmarks with small market shares for representation purposes. Second, pension funds sometimes report customized benchmarks which are a linear combination of standard benchmarks, e.g. 50% * S&P 500 + 50% * Russell 3000. We also omitted the customized benchmarks from the figures. 16 The value-weighted Russell 1000 and 3000 indices include the largest 1,000 and 3,000 stocks, respectively, as determined by their market capitalization at the end of June each year. The Russell 1000 represents about 90% of the market cap in the Russell 3000. The Wilshire 5000 is a monthly-updated market cap-weighted index of all stocks actively traded in the US, typically holding more than 5,000 stocks. 
2 Basic Performance Evaluation Results
In this subsection, we present the basic performance evaluation results for the pension funds in our sample using the random coefficients model as described in Section 3. The results at the fund level are given in Table 6 , using both net returns and net benchmark-adjusted returns. We separately provide results for DB funds versus DC funds. We report the annual alpha and the beta coefficients on the market, size, value and momentum factors, plus the root mean squared error of the residual.
Overall, we find that at the fund level, risk-adjusted performance is consistently positive. For DB funds, the evidence for outperformance is strongest, with an abnormal return of 1.32% per year (tstatistic of 4.93) using net returns and of 45 basis points per year (t-statistic of 1.82) using benchmark-adjusted net returns. For DC funds, the results indicate similar outperformance but with weaker statistical significance. The larger standard errors for DC funds are likely due to the considerably smaller sample of DC funds and the shorter data period of available DC data (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) relative to our large sample of DB funds (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . The annualized alpha of DC funds equals 1.40% (t-statistic of 2.74) using net returns and a statistically insignificant 83 basis points (t-statistic of 1.52) using benchmark-adjusted net returns. Performance results at the mandate level for DB funds are given in Table 7A (and in Table 7B for DC funds). For DB funds, the alphas are consistently positive for all the different mandates, though with varying economic and statistical magnitudes. The outperformance is strongest for the small cap mandates, where both net returns and benchmark-adjusted net returns show remarkably large and statistically significant alphas. For example, the annualized alpha of small cap DB mandates equals 5.43% (t-statistic of 5.59) using net returns and 3.08% (t-statistic of 3.54) using benchmark-adjusted net returns. Large cap mandates have much smaller positive alphas that become insignificant once we consider benchmark-adjusted net returns. Specifically, the annualized alpha of large cap DB mandates equals 87 basis points (t-statistic of 3.25) using net returns and 21 basis points (t-statistic of 0.86) using benchmark-adjusted net returns.
Both active and passive DB mandates show positive alphas, which are much reduced economically when using benchmark-adjusted net returns while remaining (marginally) statistically significant. Given that small cap mandates tend to have higher proportions of active management (see Table 3 ) and small cap mandates were found to have higher alphas than large cap mandates (see Panel A of Table 7A ), it is not surprising that the actively managed mandates have alphas that are in between those of large and small cap mandates. For net returns, the alpha of the actively managed mandate equals 1.68% per year (t-statistic of 5.26), with an alpha of 0.53% per year (t-statistic of 1.72) using benchmark-adjusted net returns.
The alphas for benchmark-adjusted net returns of the passive mandates are 39 basis points a year Finally, for DB funds we can also distinguish between externally and internally managed mandates. Externally managed mandates represent about 88% of the DB fund investments but with higher small cap and passively managed mandate allocations. As a result, it seems consistent that these alphas fall broadly in between the large cap and actively managed mandate alphas.
Using benchmark-adjusted net returns, the externally managed mandate alphas are about 44 basis points per year (with a t-statistic of 1.70). The corresponding alphas for the internally managed mandates are higher but without statistical significance, at 1.68% per year (with a t-statistic of 1.38), though these are harder to compare to the other mandates as internally managed mandates are relatively infrequent and occur more at the larger funds. For both of these mandate levels, results using net returns (rather than benchmark-adjusted returns) indicate larger positive alphas that are statistically significant.
Next, for DC funds (see Table 7B ) we can separate large cap versus small cap mandates, as well as actively versus passively managed mandates. Like Table 6 , the results are again noisier than for DB funds, which we ascribe to the smaller sample and shorter time period, such that the results should be interpreted with some caution. In particular, using benchmark-adjusted net returns, all alphas are statistically insignificant. For example, the alpha of large cap DC mandates equals 89 basis points per year (with a t-statistic of 2.21) using net returns and 52 basis points (tstatistic of 1.19) using benchmark-adjusted net returns. For small cap mandates, all alphas are insignificant. The strongest outperformance for DC funds, both economically and statistically, occurs for the actively managed mandates, with an annualized alpha of 2.48% (t-statistic of 1.92) using net returns. Using benchmark-adjusted net returns, the alpha is 2.01% per year (with tstatistic of 1.60, insignificant but close to standard significance levels). Finally, alphas of passive mandates of DC funds are insignificant.
We provide a robustness check in Table 8 for all the results in Tables 6, 7A and 7B. Rather than using the random coefficients model, in this table we estimate all alphas with the three-stage Brennan, Chordia and Subhramanyam (1998, henceforth BCS) methodology. We will further employ this methodology in the subsequent chapter, as it gives a convenient way to link pension fund characteristics to their performance. The main difference between the two methodologies is that the BCS standard errors are robust to cross-sectional correlations between funds in any year.
In contrast, the random coefficients model assumes that the residual pension fund returns are uncorrelated. Table 8 presents the alphas at the total fund levels and the various mandate levels for both net returns and benchmark-adjusted net returns, and for both defined benefit and defined contribution funds. In general, the results are very similar when we change methodologies. The alphas are generally positive, smaller if we also benchmark-adjust, and largest for small cap mandates. For example, the annualized alpha for defined benefit small cap mandates, using benchmark-adjusted net returns, equals 2.35% (t-statistic of 2.25), while for defined contribution small cap mandates it equals 1.33% (t-statistic of 3.34).
Interpreting Pension Fund performance: Liquidity and Size
In this section, we aim to provide further interpretation of the basic result that pension funds tend to exhibit economically large, positive abnormal returns in their small cap portfolios, and slight outperformance of their benchmarks in general. We consider two main explanations, namely of liquidity and skill, as well as their interaction. First, as the small cap mandates have the largest positive alphas, these could potentially be driven by liquidity. Since pension funds often have liabilities with a long duration, they naturally have longer-term investment horizons and may consequently invest in illiquid equity investments, thereby gaining the liquidity premium associated with these investments.
A considerable literature (see e.g. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005)) has established that illiquid investments may generate higher returns. As a result, it may be important to adjust the net returns for liquidity risk, which we do by appending the traded liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) as available on WRDS to our factor model. Their factor is motivated by the idea that lower liquidity is associated with greater return reversals after larger order flows. The factor is based on the average of an individual-stock measure of such return reversals. Empirically, they find that stocks with higher sensitivities (or betas) to this systematic liquidity factor have larger average returns than stocks with lower betas.
Second, another explanation for the positive alphas, especially for small cap mandates, is that pension funds may have some skill in selecting (external) managers that outperform, even on a risk-adjusted basis, the standard benchmarks. If so, this outperformance may be easier to achieve in smaller portfolios, if there is a limited amount of good investable ideas and limited liquidity for the market to absorb larger informed trades. 19 Therefore, we will consider the role of the size of the equity holdings and its interaction with liquidity in explaining the pension fund outperformance.
Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004, henceforth CHHK) is a closely related paper that provides further insight into the role of size for performance, showing that U.S. equity mutual fund returns are decreasing in fund size. They attribute this to liquidity and organizational diseconomies and their interaction. While they do not employ a liquidity factor directly, they find that small cap growth fund performance tends to have a stronger negative association with fund size than large cap fund performance, which they argue is driven by liquidity. Further, CHHK consider the role of fund organization by comparing fund size with family size. While fund size has a negative association with performance, fund family size tends to be positively related to fund performance.
They interpret the latter result as possible evidence for economies of scale in trading costs, and further use it to distinguish between two different organizational diseconomies: bureaucracy and associated coordination costs (see Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1988 versus hierarchical costs of 19 Theoretical support for this notion can be found in for example Berk and Green (2004) and Dermine and Roeller (1992) . Blake, Timmermann, Tonks and Wermers (2010) point out that specialized managers with smaller portfolios and expertise in certain type of stocks outperform managers with larger portfolios who also have to make asset allocation decisions.
convincing others when transmitting soft information (see Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Stein (2002)). Assuming that bureaucratic costs are greater in large fund families and thus rejecting the first explanation, CHHK find direct evidence for the second by considering different proxies for the amount of soft information available and the level of hierarchical complexity.
Appealing to a similar intuition, we will consider fund versus mandate size. The relationship between different mutual funds within the same family is not exactly analogous to how different pension fund mandates relate to the overall pension fund. However, a key commonality between these two cases is that many investment decisions will likely be made at the lower levels in the organization (i.e., at the mandate or the mutual fund level rather than at the pension fund or mutual fund family level), with the larger organization providing oversight and assistance with e.g. trading execution. One important difference is that for the small cap mandates in our sample, about 90% of investments are done externally, which adds another layer of monitoring.
Other pension fund characteristics that we can use to help interpreting the pension fund outperformance are the allocations to small cap, passively managed mandates, and internally managed mandates. Small cap stocks are likely to be less liquid but provide greater opportunity for stock picking, whereas passively managed mandates would likely be most liquid but with little role for skill. Finally, internally managed mandates might be easier to monitor and thus be associated with lower hierarchical costs, and with potential economies of scale in research generation.
We start by considering the effects of adding a liquidity factor to our four-factor performance evaluation model. Table 9 presents the abnormal returns using the resulting five-factor model with a liquidity factor for both DB and DC funds and their respective mandates. To save space, we only report the annual alpha and the coefficient on the liquidity factor (i.e., its beta), but not the betas of the other four included factors in our performance evaluation model. We also only show results using only net returns in Table 9 and subsequent tables, again to save space and because this is much more common in the literature than using benchmark-adjusted returns.
However, we have verified that the results using benchmark-adjusted net returns are similar.
The liquidity beta is negative and statistically significant in most specifications for DB funds, but is insignificant for DC funds with a single exception (positive and significant for passive DC mandates). As a result, adding the liquidity factor has some impact on the abnormal return estimates for DB funds and hardly impacts the alphas of the DC funds. However, as the liquidity beta estimates for DB funds and mandates are negative and the liquidity factor earns a large positive premium, this addition does not reduce the outperformance previously discussed in Tables 6, 7A and 7B. 20 As a result, the positive alphas can not be explained by an exposure to systematic liquidity risk.
How surprising are the negative loadings on the liquidity factor? As a reference, we consider the results from Table 9 in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), which show the liquidity betas for ten portfolios sorted on market capitalization, using a model that also includes a market, size, value and momentum factor. In general, large cap stock portfolios tend to have negative liquidity betas, and only the smallest cap stock portfolios have positive liquidity betas. For example, the valueweighted size decile 3 portfolio, with small caps, has a liquidity beta of 1.95. However, the size deciles portfolios 4, 6, 8 and 9 all have negative liquidity betas (though none of them are statistically significant in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)). If we assume that pension funds will primarily invest in Russell 3000 stocks, even in their small cap mandates, these would correspond to approximately size decile portfolios 4 -10 over our time period of 1990 -2006. Therefore, the negative betas we find seem to be consistent with the results in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).
Next, in Table 10A and further, we investigate how the size of the equity holdings is related to pension fund performance by regressing pension fund alphas on size cross-sectionally. When using performance at the mandate level, we employ both mandate and total fund size, showing results for either (columns 1 -2 for mandate size and columns 3 -4 for total fund size) and for both in a single specification (columns 5 -7). Our methodology is the three-stage regression analysis as implemented by Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) and described in Section 3. We only present results for the third-stage time series regressions, where we regress the characteristics loadings of the alphas on a constant and the five factors of our performance evaluation model (i.e., market, size, value, momentum and liquidity, as in Table 9 ), and show only the resulting coefficients for the constant for each of the characteristics. As we again include the first-stage factors in this third-stage regression, any exposure to these five factors should be controlled for.
First, we consider the role of fund and mandate size in Table 10A . For DB funds, we find strong evidence for a negative association between fund performance and size. At the total fund level, the coefficient of the log of the total size of the equity holdings equals -0.011 (t-statistic of 5.26).
The economic magnitude of this association is substantial. For example, a shift increasing size from a DB fund at the 25% percentile of the size distribution to the median size is associated with an alpha that is 1.2% lower (=-0.011 x (ln[1200]-ln [489] ). This seems broadly consistent with CHHK, who find a size coefficient that is about twice as large for their sample of mutual funds, which are typically much smaller than the pension funds in our database. At the mandate level, this negative association between size and performance is likewise found, except for small cap mandates and passive mandates. The lack of any association between small cap mandate performance and size is surprising, and will be explored further below. The insignificance of the coefficient of log size in the performance regression for passive mandates seems reasonable, as investing in passive indices seems relatively easily scalable.
Finally, when we use both mandate and fund size together in the mandate-level performance regressions (see columns 5 -7), the coefficient on mandate size remains negative and significant, while fund size is insignificant. 21 The insignificance of fund size indicates that bureaucratic costs themselves may not explain much of the negative association between performance and size, if larger funds have indeed greater levels of such costs. Here, the results for internally managed mandates may be most instructive, if bureaucratic costs seem most relevant there. For externally managed mandates, the bureaucratic costs may be more dependent on the complexity or size of the external manager rather than the pension fund.
For DC funds, the evidence of this negative association is considerably weaker, as the size coefficient is insignificant at the fund level and positive and significant for large cap mandates.
For small cap and active mandates, this coefficient is also large and negative, but both mandate and fund size coefficients become insignificant when both are used.
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The positive and significant coefficient for large cap mandates is economically small, though it is large for the small cap mandate. The latter is surprising, suggesting that small cap funds that are larger perform better and that liquidity constraints may be second-order. In order to better understand these findings and the result of the insignificant size coefficient for small cap DB mandates, we add the interaction between mandate size and the first-stage liquidity beta, and report the results in Table 10B . This interaction is meant to capture the idea that liquidity concerns are greatest for the largest funds with on average the largest order sizes, see for example, Keim and Madhavan (1997) and Chan and Lakonishok (1995, 1997) . 21 Multicollinearity concerns prevent us from using both mandate and fund size for large cap mandates. However, for all other mandate levels, multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem. 22 Fund size and mandate are strongly correlated, especially for mandate types that represent large parts of the overall portfolio (e.g. large cap). For smaller mandate types (internally or passively managed) the correlation is substantially below 80%. The correlation equals 91% for actively managed mandates.
The first and second-stage regressions are identical to those used for Table 10A , and again only the third-stage results are reported, for the constant, the size coefficient, and the new coefficient on the interaction between size and the liquidity beta. These results negate the idea that liquidity does not matter for DC funds, as the interaction effect is consistently both economically and statistically relevant. 23 The negative coefficient on the interaction means that larger funds benefit more from increased liquidity (i.e., a more negative liquidity beta). For small cap DC mandates, For DB funds, the interaction between size and liquidity is also consistently negative and generally significant.
We simultaneously consider all the various pension fund characteristics and their relation to performance in Table 11A and Table 11A for DB and DC funds, respectively. Again using the three-stage regression analysis as in Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) and described in Section 3, we regress alphas on fund and mandate characteristics using the five-factor model with liquidity risk in estimating alphas. Next to size and its interaction with liquidity, we further include the percentage allocations to small cap, passively managed and internally managed mandates, a dummy for public funds, and the interactions of the passively and internally managed allocations with size. 24 Given the data requirements in estimating these three-stage regressions, we show the results only at the fund level ('Total').
The percentage of small cap allocations is positively related to performance, consistent with the larger outperformance of small cap mandates in Table 6 . However, the coefficient on the small cap allocation turns insignificant and/or drops by about half once the interaction of mandate size and liquidity beta is included. We document this for both DB and DC funds. For example, for DC funds, the coefficient on small cap allocation equals 0.0308 (t-statistic of 2.84) without the sizeliquidity-interaction and 0.0093 (t-statistic of 0.79) with this interaction. For DB funds, results are similar. This suggests that the outperformance at the fund-level may be largely due to liquidity and not greater selection ability of small cap managers.
23 Note that both the first and third stage regressions directly control for the direct effect of liquidity risk or the liquidity beta. Further, multicollinearity between size and its interaction with the liquidity beta is not a major concern. In Table 10B , we report the cross-sectional correlation between log mandate size and its interaction with the first-stage liquidity beta. 24 For DC funds we do not include a dummy for public funds, as there are almost none.
Next, the allocation to passively managed mandates is consistently negative for DB funds, consistent with any outperformance coming primarily from actively managed mandates (see also   Table 7A ). For DC funds, the coefficient on the percentage of investments in passively managed mandates becomes positive when we add the interaction of size and the passive allocations, which itself is strongly negative. It is unclear why the passive allocations would perform worse for larger funds, but only for DC funds.
Finally, we consider the allocations to internally versus externally managed mandates. This only applies to DB funds, as all DC funds are externally managed. Internally managed mandates may be easier to monitor and thus be associated with lower hierarchical costs. However, it may take considerable resources to build a research department internally, which could conceivably be done more efficiently externally if there are economies of scale in research generation. Our results provide some limited confirmation of both of these hypotheses. The percentage of internally managed investments is negative but insignificant once we also control for the sizeliquidity interaction. Further, the interaction of internal management allocations with size has a positive coefficient at the fund level. However, it is only significant (t-statistic of 2.27) if the sizeliquidity interaction is not included and has a t-statistic of only about 1.66 once this other interaction is included.
Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the performance and costs of the domestic equity investments of a large sample of US pension funds. The new, bias-free CEM database enables us to provide a detailed overview of the pension fund performance and their costs, both at the fund level and the various mandate levels (i.e., large cap versus small cap, internally versus externally and actively versus passively managed).
We document that cost levels for pension funds are considerably lower than those of mutual funds. This may be primarily due to pension funds' larger sizes, which may result in higher bargaining power and / or more efficient operations. Specifically, large pension funds have much lower costs than smaller funds. For example, the largest 30% of DB funds have costs of about 15
basis points a year, versus an average cost of 40 basis points a year for the smallest 30% of DB funds.
We find that the domestic equity investments of US pension funds tend to generate positive abnormal (i.e., risk-adjusted) returns after expenses and trading costs. This seems in sharp contrast with the average underperformance of mutual funds. Furthermore, especially small cap mandates have positive alpha and outperform their benchmarks. For example, small cap mandates of defined benefit funds have an annualized net, benchmark-adjusted alpha of 3.08% (t-statistic 3.54). Large cap mandates have generally smaller alphas that become insignificant after also benchmark-adjusting the net returns.
We find that fund size and liquidity, as well as their interaction, are critical drivers of pension fund performance. Fund size and performance are strongly negatively associated, similar to Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004) . In addition, this negative association is stronger for less liquid investments, where the price impact of trading will be larger. Therefore, it seems that liquidity limitations allow only small cap mandates to outperform their benchmarks.
With regards to other pension fund choices, our results are only suggestive. Unsurprisingly, the abnormal returns are larger for funds with more actively managed mandates, as passive mandates (even if 'enhanced' or with stock lending programs) are unlikely to significantly outperform the benchmarks. We find some weak evidence that larger internally managed funds may do better, suggesting economies of scale in the development of internal research and trading operations.
One possible interpretation is that, next to size and liquidity, the large pension funds in our sample are able to select the best external small cap managers. Their considerable size and large bargaining power may allow them to monitor these managers closely and keep costs relatively low. However, the benefits to performance at the fund level are limited, as small cap allocations are only a relatively small part of the overall equity investments by pension funds. Our results suggest that this limitation of small cap allocations may be driven largely by liquidity constraints.
While the samples have many differences and a more careful comparison falls outside the scope of this paper, it may still be instructive to compare the performance of defined benefit versus defined contribution pension funds. We conclude that in general, defined benefit performance seems better. For example, the small cap mandates outperform their benchmarks by about 3% for defined benefit funds and by about 1.3% for defined contribution funds. We also find that costs tend to be higher for defined contribution pension funds. Both would be consistent with the idea that monitoring of external managers and using bargaining power to lower costs are more efficient at defined benefit plans, potentially because of improved incentives. Future research is needed to investigate the extent to which these results also hold internationally and across different asset classes.
Table 1: # of Funds Entering, Exiting and Remaining in the Database
This table displays the number of defined benefit and defined contribution pension funds in the CEM database in the sample periods 1990-1996 (for defined benefit only) and [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Panel A reports the number of defined benefit funds for in period 1990-1996, Panel B the number of defined benefit funds in the period 1997-2006 and Panel C the number of defined contribution pension funds in the sample period 1997-2006. We also display the number of funds entering and exiting the database.
Panel A : DB 1990 : DB -1996 : DB 1990 : DB 1991 : DB 1992 : DB 1993 : DB 1994 : DB 1995 : DB 1996 Compustat year-return combinations into two groups. The first groups contains years in which funds left the CEM database, the second group contains the remaining year-return combinations. The columns classified as "exit" in Panel A reports the results of a t-test on the mean difference between the groups. We repeat the test with a different classification. We now divide observations into years in which funds report for the first time to CEM (except for the first year) and remaining observations. The results for this test are reported in the columns labeled "Entry". In a second class of tests we perform a logit regression of presence in the CEM database on total plan ROA, i.e. the return on total plan assets and a number of control variables. We consider total plan ROA because it is more likely that a fund enters or leaves the database as a result of bad total ROA than equity returns only. As control variables we select the total equity holdings of the fund and the total equity holdings squared. The results of the logit regressions, with and without control variables, are reported in Panel B. Robust t-statistics are given between parentheses. (2003) traded liquidity factor. for every fund with sufficient time series observations. In the second stage, we augment the alphas retrieved from the first stage with the error terms of the first stage and regress them cross-sectionally in every period on a set of characteristics. In the third stage, we regress the time series of cross-sectional loadings on a constant and the first stage factors and correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (using Newey-West with three lags). We report the third stage constants for every characteristic (with t-statistic in parentheses). We perform the analysis for the total fund, and then for large and small cap mandates, actively and passively managed mandates, and externally and internally managed mandates. We perform the analysis separately for defined benefit fund in the period 1990-2006 (Panel A) and defined contribution funds for the period 1997-2006 (Panel B). We consider 3 different models: in columns 1-2, we use log mandate size only, in columns 3-4 log total fund size only, and in columns 5-7 both log mandate size and log total fund size. Size is always measured using equity holdings alone. Table 10A for a description. We perform the analysis separately for defined benefit fund in the period 1990-2006 (Panel A) and defined contribution funds for the period -2006 . We select a constant, log mandate size and the interaction of log mandate size with the first stage fund-specific loading on the liquidity factor as characteristics. The final column reports the cross-sectional correlation between log mandate size and its interaction with the first stage fund-specific loading on the liquidity factor. Size is always measured using equity holdings alone. Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) ), see Table 10A for a description. We perform the analysis at the fund-level, for defined benefit funds in the period 1990-2006 (Panel A) and for defined contribution funds in the period -2006 . As characteristics we select a constant, log mandate size, the percentage of domestic equity invested in small cap mandates, the percentage of domestic equity invested in passively managed mandates, the percentage of domestic equity invested in internally managed mandates, a dummy for public funds, log mandate size times the earlier mentioned percentages and the fund-specific liquidity beta from the first stage regression times the log mandate size. 
